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Liberty at the Cost of Constitutional 
Protections: Undocumented Immigrants 
and Fourth Amendment Rights 
Linet Suárez* 
The Supreme Court has issued many opinions indirectly ad-
dressing the Fourth amendment rights of undocumented im-
migrants. However, none of these opinions answer the ques-
tions that matter most: do undocumented immigrants have 
Fourth Amendment protections and if so, what are they. 
These questions have increasingly become more important 
because advances in technology facilitate intrusive searches 
and seizures by law enforcement officers. This article will 
specifically focus on the Department of Homeland Security 
and its use of GPS ankle bracelets to monitor undocumented 
immigrants. This article compares existing Supreme Court 
opinions concerning undocumented immigrants and Fourth 
Amendment rights in the technological age. It is now more 
important than ever to find some legal clarity if we ever plan 
to answer how far is too far 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Statue of Liberty is engraved with the words “give me your 
tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,” but 
it diplomatically omits any mention of subjecting these masses to 
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intrusive government searches.1 It would be more accurate for Lady 
Liberty to add that freedom might come at the expense of privacy. 
Currently, over nine million undocumented immigrants are liv-
ing in the United States and between a half-million and one million 
more arrive each year.2 Congress frequently creates laws in hopes 
of regulating immigration, but those laws adversely affect undocu-
mented immigrants and would otherwise be unacceptable if applied 
to citizens or residents with a legal status.3   However, in the words 
of Supreme Court Justice Stevens, “even one whose presence in this 
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [some] 
constitutional protection.”4 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures—that is assuming the Fourth Amendment applies.5 
United States citizens and residents with a legal status are entitled to 
receive constitutional protections, such as that of the Fourth Amend-
ment.6 Undocumented immigrants are not afforded such a clear-cut 
answer.7 Instead, when the Supreme Court is tasked with addressing 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to undocumented immi-
grants it replies with the proverbial “it depends.” Undocumented im-
migrants in the United States are thus living in Fourth Amendment 
limbo. 
The uncertainty concerning the Fourth Amendment and undoc-
umented immigrants results in a chilling effect.8 Constitutional free-
doms are delicate and require “breathing space” to survive.9 Consti-
tutional freedoms suffer when the government excessively regulates 
                                                                                                             
 1 The New Colossus-full text, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.
nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/colossus.htm. 
 2 Kevin J. Fandl, Immigration Posses: U.S. Immigration Law and Local Enf
orcement Practices, 34 J. LEGIS. 16, 16. (2008). 
 3 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976). 
 4 Id. at 77. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6 Henry G. Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the Ins: An Update on Lo-
cating the Undocumented and a Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based 
Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 
501 (1991). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. 
L. REV. 808 (1969). 
 9 Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
432-33 (1963). 
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because the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions.”10 Whatever consti-
tutional freedoms undocumented immigrants do have are “chilled” 
because of the uncertainty regarding their rights and a fear of gov-
ernment sanctions.11 Undocumented immigrants would rather suffer 
unreasonable searches than risk aggravating government officials by 
appealing to Fourth Amendment rights that they may or may not 
have.12 The uncertainty surrounding the Fourth Amendment thus 
turns constitutional freedoms that the Founding Fathers intended to 
be a shield for protection into a sword that the government can wield 
against a vulnerable population. 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is currently 
testing the limits of Fourth Amendment protections with its Alter-
native to Detention Programs.13 DHS does not have sufficient de-
tention centers to house all the undocumented immigrants coming 
into the United States.14 Additionally, the detention centers are ex-
pensive and cost an average of $130 per day per person or up to $330 
depending on the detention center.15 As a result, DHS is experiment-
ing with low-cost programs to monitor undocumented immigrants.16 
The most recent experimental monitoring program from DHS is the 
RGV 250 program.17 Under this type of program, DHS releases un-
documented immigrant families from custody, but requires that the 
heads of households wear a GPS ankle bracelet for an undetermined 
amount of time.18 The ankle bracelet alternative only costs an aver-
age of $5 a day.19 
                                                                                                             
 10 Id. 
 11 See US: Immigrants ‘Afraid to Call 911’States Should Reject Corrosive 
‘Secure Communities’ Program, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 14, 2014), https:/
/www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/us-immigrants-afraid-call-911. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Alicia A. Caldwell, DHS Is Using GPS-Enabled Ankle Bracelets To Track 
Immigrant Families Crossing The Border, MCGILL (Dec. 24, 2014), http://oppen-
heimer.mcgill.ca/DHS-Is-Using-GPS-Enabled-Ankle?lang=fr. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Immigrants Object to Growing Use of Ankle Monit
ors After Detention, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes
.com/nation/immigration/la-na-immigrant-ankle-monitors-20150802-story.html. 
 16 Caldwell, supra note 13. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Hennessy-Fiske , supra note 15. 
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Undocumented immigrants commonly refer to these ankle 
bracelets as grilletes, or shackles.20 One of the reasons the ankle 
bracelets are reminiscent of shackles is because the devices have 
short cords and have to be charged frequently for an estimated two 
hours at a time.21 This makes finding job, let alone keeping a job, a 
difficult, if not impossible, task.22 Undocumented immigrants also 
complain that the ankle bracelets are hot and irritate their skin.23 
Most notably, the ankle bracelets are a conspicuous stigma that 
brands undocumented immigrants as criminals.24 This affects the 
ability of undocumented immigrants to find employment as well as 
housing.25 Despite the potential issues of legal consent and the de-
bilitating criminal stigma attached to wearing ankle monitors, DHS 
monitored a total of 23,000 undocumented immigrants with ankle 
bracelets in 2015, and plans to increase that number to 53,000 in 
2016.26 
The Supreme Court addressed the dangers that advanced tech-
nologies, such as ankle bracelets, pose to an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights in multiple cases. The Supreme Court has even 
held the Government’s use of GPS devices to conduct searches is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment in more than one instance. In 
United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that GPS tracking 
on a car constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment.27 More recently, the Supreme Court took another step 
towards establishing a precedent against the Government’s use of 
GPS technology for searches. In Grady v. North Carolina, the Su-
preme Court held that a civil program that used GPS ankle bracelets 
to monitor recidivist sex offenders was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and constituted a search.28 
                                                                                                             
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Hennessy-Fiske , supra note 15. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 28 Grady v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015). 
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The Supreme Court displayed a high regard for privacy and 
strong disapproval of unreasonable government searches of a per-
son’s body or effects in Jones and Grady.29 Jones and Grady are 
Fourth Amendment landmarks, but it is still unclear how a person’s 
legal status in the country would factor into a Fourth Amendment 
analysis because it was not at issue in either Jones or Grady. 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional rights of undoc-
umented immigrants in several cases, but it still remains unclear 
what constitutional rights undocumented immigrants are entitled to 
have or when they can invoke those constitutional rights. In Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, the majority 
of Justices simply assumed that undocumented immigrants had 
Fourth Amendment rights.30 The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza 
stressed the importance of Fourth Amendment rights for all persons, 
but did not distinguish or define the word “persons.”31 The Supreme 
Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez limited the scope of 
Fourth Amendment rights for undocumented immigrants by debat-
ing the meaning of the word “persons” versus the word “people.”32 
Nevertheless, despite an extensive constitutional analysis, the Su-
preme Court Justices in Verdugo-Urquidez were still unable to reach 
a definitive decision about the Fourth Amendment rights of undoc-
umented immigrants.33 The Justices however did provide more clar-
ity on the topic by creating a substantial connections test.34 
This article will explore how undocumented immigration status 
in the United States can influence a court’s determination on 
whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated in DHS programs re-
quiring ankle bracelet monitoring. This article is composed of three 
parts. Part I discusses the possible Fourth Amendment rights of un-
documented immigrants. Part II examines the use of GPS devices 
and the constitutionality of the DHS programs such as the RGV 250 
program. Part III concludes that the DHS programs using ankle 
bracelet monitoring are unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                             
 29 Id.; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
 30 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984); United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990). 
 31 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046. 
 32 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
 33 Id. at 272-73. 
 34 Id. at 271-73. 
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II.  ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. DHS in a Historical Context 
The United States has been concerned with the issue of immi-
gration since the late 1700’s.35 During that time, Congress began to 
take preemptive measures against the possibility of incoming immi-
grants because the United States feared a cold war with France.36  
Congress proposed multiple bills that were eventually signed into 
law by President John Adams.37 These bills resulted in the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798.38 The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 gave 
federal agents the power and discretion to remove all dangerous im-
migrants.39 As a result of this broad power, any political dissent was 
effectively criminalized.40 
Immigration was radically reformed again in 1933 when Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6166 and created 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).41 Following 
the Executive Order, the INS agency was tasked with the immigra-
tion and deportation functions that initially were assigned to the Bu-
reau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization.42 
The INS was the primary agency that addressed immigration 
concerns until President George W. Bush revaluated immigration 
policies after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.43 President Bush signed the 
Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, that dismantled INS 
and created DHS.44 Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS is given 
broad jurisdiction so that it may “(A) prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States 
                                                                                                             
 35 Joseph Summerill, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Introduces 
“Friendly” Federal Detention Standards and New, Softer Detention Facilities, 
59-SEP FED. LAW. 46, 46 (2012). 
 36 Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the 
Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 438 (2007). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Summerill, supra note 35, at 46. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 513, 513 (2003). 
 44 Id. 
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to terrorism; [and] (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recov-
ery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.”45 
Under the newly established DHS, the former duties of the INS 
were transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”).46 ICE’s mission is to target undocumented immigrants, 
money, and material that could be linked to terrorism or general 
criminal activities.47 ICE promotes and enforces the DHS’s mission 
through arrests, detainment, raids, and more recently, the use of an-
kle bracelets for monitoring.48 
The history of immigration in the United States reveals that “for 
reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating 
the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has 
been committed to the political branches of the Federal Govern-
ment.”49 As a result, since the 1700’s, the regulation of immigration, 
especially in times of warfare or political turmoil, has pushed con-
stitutional boundaries.50 Despite the discretion of the executive and 
legislative branches over immigration, the Supreme Court has 
stressed that DHS is still “subject to important constitutional limita-
tions.”51  DHS’s broad mission does not justify its possibly uncon-
stitutional enforcement methods.52 DHS must only act by “constitu-
tionally permissible means.”53 
B. The Problem: What Rights do Undocumented Immigrants 
Actually Have? 
Immigration is within the domain of federal law, but the federal 
government and courts have not been successful at providing clear 
guidelines.54 When it comes to immigration, there are many gaps in 
the law because there is no comprehensive immigration reform at 
                                                                                                             
 45 Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 101. 
 46 Summerill, supra note 35, at 46. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Fandl, supra note 2, at 21; Caldwell, supra note 13. 
 49 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 8. 
 50 See Lash & Harrison, supra note 36; Thiessen, supra note 43. 
 51 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); Kelsey E. Papst, Protecting 
the Voiceless: Ensuring Ice’s Compliance with Standards That Protect Immigrati
on Detainees, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 261, 265 (2009). 
 52 Papst, supra note 51, at 265. 
 53 Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983)). 
 54 Fandl, supra note 2, at 20, 22. 
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the federal level.55 For example, as of November 2007, 46 states 
passed legislation related to immigration and over 1,562 bills were 
introduced in all 50 states.56 In total, that was an increase of nearly 
300% from year 2006.57 These gaps create inconsistencies in the law 
and endow DHS and immigration officials with excessive discre-
tion.58 
Immigration is at its a core a complex matter that is further com-
plicated by political disagreements regarding the best way to man-
age incoming immigrants while also maintaining national security.59 
Federal courts intervene when immigration officials or agencies 
overstep constitutional boundaries, but not even the Supreme Court 
has provided much guidance when it comes to immigration.60 The 
lack of clarity regarding the constitutional rights of undocumented 
immigrants is largely in part because the Constitution does not dis-
tinguish between documented or undocumented immigrants when it 
comes to constitutional protections.61 The courts are therefore split 
and have only been able to agree that undocumented immigrants are 
entitled to some degree of Fourth Amendment protection.62 
1. The Assumption of Fourth Amendment Rights: Immigration 
and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza 
Adan Lopez-Mendoza was working at a transmission repair 
shop in San Mateo, California in 1976.63 After receiving a tip, INS 
agents visited the transmission shop to investigate.64 However, the 
INS agents arrived without a warrant to search the premises or a 
warrant to arrest any of the people on the premises.65 The proprietor 
of the transmission shop refused to allow the INS agents to interview 
                                                                                                             
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 22. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Fandl, supra note 2, at 23. 
 60 Marisa Antos-Fallon, The Fourth Amendment and Immigration Enforce-
ment in the Home: Can Ice Target the Utmost Sphere of Privacy?, 35 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 999, 1014-15 (2008). 
 61 Fandl, supra note 2, at 29. 
 62 Antos-Fallon, supra note 60, at 1003. 
 63 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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the workers, but one of the INS agents managed to speak to Lopez-
Mendoza while another INS agent was having a conversation with 
the proprietor.66 
The INS agent asked Lopez-Mendoza multiple questions and 
Lopez-Mendoza ultimately revealed that he was from Mexico and 
had no family ties in the United States.67 At this point, the INS agent 
placed Lopez-Mendoza under arrest and had him taken to an INS 
office.68 At the INS office, Lopez-Mendoza revealed that he was 
born in Mexico, was a citizen of Mexico, and entered the United 
States illegally without inspection.69 
INS began deportation proceedings against Lopez-Mendoza, but 
Lopez-Mendoza challenged the legality of his arrest.70 Lopez-Men-
doza’s case went through the judicial system until it reached the 
Court of Appeals.71 The Court of Appeals vacated the order of de-
portation and remanded the case in order to determine whether 
Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated dur-
ing the course of his arrest.72 The Court of Appeals mentioned  
“Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights,” but did not specify 
or analyze which Fourth Amendment rights Lopez-Mendoza was 
entitled to have under the Constitution.73 
By the time Lopez-Mendoza’s case reached the Supreme Court, 
the Justices already assumed Lopez-Mendoza had Fourth Amend-
ment rights even though he was an undocumented immigrant.74 The 
Supreme Court instead focused on whether Lopez-Mendoza had the 
right to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in civil pro-
ceedings.75 
Lopez-Mendoza argued to the Supreme Court that the exclusion-
ary rule was necessary to safeguard his Fourth Amendment rights in 
                                                                                                             
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 1035-36. 
 71 Id. at 1036. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1036. 
 74 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272. 
 75 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034. 
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the United States.76 At this point, even Lopez-Mendoza was assum-
ing that he had Fourth Amendment rights.77 The Supreme Court Jus-
tices did not correct Lopez-Mendoza’s assumption or ask him to 
elaborate on which of his Fourth Amendment rights were in dan-
ger.78 
The Supreme Court instead ultimately held that the exclusionary 
rule was not applicable in civil deportation proceedings.79 Justice 
O’Connor wrote on behalf of the majority and explained, “important 
as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all [emphasis 
added] persons, there is no convincing indication that application of 
the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings will contribute 
materially to that end.”80 In the opinion, Justice O’Connor did not 
distinguish between the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented 
immigrants versus the Fourth Amendment rights of a person with a 
legal immigration status. 
The Lopez-Mendoza case does not explicitly state that undocu-
mented immigrants have any Fourth Amendment rights.81 However, 
throughout the entire opinion the Supreme Court implies that undoc-
umented immigrants have at a minimum some Fourth Amendment 
rights.82 
2. Limiting the Scope of the Fourth Amendment: United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
Undocumented immigrants have relied on the holding of Lopez-
Mendoza to invoke Fourth Amendment rights, but Lopez-Mendoza 
does not stand for the proposition that undocumented immigrants 
have Fourth Amendment rights.83 If anything, Lopez-Mendoza lim-
its the Fourth Amendment rights of undocumented immigrants be-
cause it bars the use of the exclusionary rule during civil deportation 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 1045. 
 77 Id. at 1045-46. 
 78 See generally id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046. 
 81 See generally id. at 1032. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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proceedings.84 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez clarifies the hold-
ing in Lopez-Mendoza and details the Fourth Amendment landscape 
for undocumented immigrants.85 
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a Mexican citizen that re-
sided in Mexico.86 The Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) sus-
pected that Verdugo-Urquidez was associated with a drug organiza-
tion that smuggled narcotics into the United States.87 Verdugo-Ur-
quidez was also a suspect in the murder and torture of a United 
States DEA agent.88 The United States Government obtained a war-
rant for his arrest in 1985 and apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in 
Mexico in January 1986 with assistance from Mexican law enforce-
ment officers.89 After the arrest, the United States Government 
brought Verdugo-Urquidez to a United States Border Patrol station 
in Calexico, California, where he was arrested by United States mar-
shals and later moved to a correctional center in San Diego, Califor-
nia.90 
After Verdugo-Urquidez was arrested and detained in the United 
States, a DEA agent arranged for searches of Verdugo-Urquidez’s 
Mexican residences in Mexicali and San Felipe.91 The DEA agent 
sought authorization from the Director General of the Mexican Fed-
eral Judicial Police, but did not ask for consent from Verdugo-Ur-
quidez or get a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate.92 
The Mexican law enforcement officials agreed to help the DEA with 
the searches and through a combined effort discovered incriminat-
ing evidence, such as a tally sheet reflecting quantities of smuggled 
marijuana, in the Mexicali residence.93 
Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress all the evidence from the 
searches in his Mexican residences because it was a violation of his 
                                                                                                             
 84 Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Re-
considered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 843 (1998). 
 85 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259. 
 86 Id. at 262. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 262-63 
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Fourth Amendment rights since the DEA did not have a warrant.94 
The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and a divided 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.95 By 
the time Verdugo-Urquidez’s case reached the Supreme Court the 
question presented was, “whether the Fourth Amendment applies to 
the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is 
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”96 
The Supreme Court began resolving the lower court constitu-
tional disputes by distinguishing the Fourth Amendment from the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.97 The Supreme Court wanted to clar-
ify that just because Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to due process 
under the Fifth Amendment and a fair trial under the Sixth Amend-
ment that does not mean that he was entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches.98 The Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments are trial rights of criminal defendants, but the Fourth 
Amendment may be applicable regardless of whether a trial takes 
place or evidence is introduced at the trial.99 Furthermore, unlike the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Fourth Amendment violations are 
“fully accomplished” at the time of the unreasonable government 
intrusion.100 In the case of Verdugo-Urquidez, this means that the 
possible Fourth Amendment violation took place outside of the 
United States in Mexico.101 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by relying on historical 
data to explain that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to pro-
tect against searches and seizures outside of the United States.102 
Historical research reveals that the Framers did not envision the 
United States as having the power to conduct searches and seizures 
outside of its borders.103 This would mean that the Fourth Amend-
ment protections would not extend to Verdugo-Urquidez because it 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. at 263. 
 95 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263. 
 96 Id. at 261. 
 97 Id. at 264. 
 98 Id. at 263. 
 99 Id. at 264. 
 100 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 266. 
 103 Id. 
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was intended to “protect the people of the United States against ar-
bitrary action by their own Government” in domestic matters.104 
Despite the historical research, Verdugo-Urquidez relied on a 
series of cases that held aliens enjoy certain constitutional rights to 
argue that Fourth Amendment protections should apply to his 
case.105 The Supreme Court distinguished the prior cases from Ver-
dugo-Urquidez’s case by stating that unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, 
those aliens received constitutional protections when they came into 
the United States because they formed “substantial connections with 
this country.”106 For example, the undocumented immigrant in 
Lopez-Mendoza “voluntarily and presumably had accepted some so-
cietal obligations.”107 On the other hand, DEA agents forcibly 
brought Verdugo-Urquidez to the United States and a “lawful, but 
involuntary presence” was not sufficient to develop any substantial 
connections to the country.108 
The Supreme Court was ultimately not persuaded by Verdugo-
Urquidez’s arguments and held that that the Fourth Amendment did 
not apply to his particular case.109 Although the Supreme Court pro-
vided a better understanding of the Fourth Amendment and created 
the substantial connection test, it still did not answer whether the 
Fourth Amendment protects undocumented immigrants.110 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT LANDSCAPE 
A. Introducing Technology to the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment states that people have the right to “be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures.”111 The Fourth Amendment has repeat-
edly been a topic of discussion in the courts because advancements 
in technology provide law enforcement officials with the tools to 
                                                                                                             
 104 Id. 
 105 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at at 270-71. 
 106 Id. at 271. 
 107 Id. at 273. 
 108 Id. at 262, 271. 
 109 Id. at 274-75. 
 110 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 286. 
 111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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conduct aggressive and prolonged searches.112 This conduct by law 
enforcement officials has inspired multiple judges to make “prolif-
erating judicial references to dystopia and George Orwell’s 1984” 
because it feels as if “Big Brother” is always watching.113 
Over the years, law enforcement officials have relied on tech-
nology, such as beepers, for tracking suspects.114 However, the more 
recent technological advancement used by law enforcement officials 
is a global positioning system (“GPS”).115 GPS is one of the pre-
ferred methods of tracking by law enforcement officers because it 
can “achieve outcomes that physical surveillance never could.”116 
GPS is unique in three ways.117 First, GPS tracking allows for 
nearly continuous surveillance.118 For example, a GPS device can 
regularly emit signals to a constellation of twenty-seven satellites, 
which theoretically means that a law enforcement official could 
have constant surveillance.119 Second, a GPS does not require much 
human oversight.120 For example, a single police office could over-
see multiple suspects being tracked with GPS at the same time.121 
Third, a GPS can access historical data and go back in time to review 
locations and dates in a way that physical surveillance by a police 
office could not.122  For example, law enforcement officials can ac-
cess information from pre-existing GPS devices, such as one that 
has been installed on a suspect’s smartphone.123 
Unlike technologies of the past, a GPS has almost no technolog-
ical limitations.124 From a law enforcement official’s perspective 
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this make surveillance simpler, but from a Fourth Amendment per-
spective it can result in more unreasonable searches.125 GPS surveil-
lance can be intrusive and reveal intimate details to law enforcement 
officials that they would otherwise not learn through more tradi-
tional surveillance.126 For example, when a GPS sends a signal to 
multiple satellites then those satellites can accurately triangulate the 
location of the GPS within a few feet, or in some cases, within ten 
inches.127 Until the courts reach a clear and consistent holding con-
cerning the legality of GPS technology in searches, Fourth Amend-
ment protections should be enforced carefully so as to guard against 
unreasonable searches.128 
B. The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment: Katz v. United States 
Courts traditionally used a common law trespass analysis to de-
termine if the Government conducted an unreasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment.129 This is commonly known as the Fourth 
Amendment property model.130 Under this model, courts would base 
their analyses on whether the search took place in a “constitutionally 
protected area.”131 However, the advancements in technology forced 
courts to adapt and consider new methods of analyzing the Fourth 
Amendment. One of the first cases to remodel traditional Fourth 
Amendment analyses was Katz v. United States.132 
The petitioner in Katz was convicted under an eight-count in-
dictment in the District Court for the Southern District of California 
for transmitting wagering information from Los Angles to Boston 
and Miami by telephone.133 Unbeknownst to Katz, he was being rec-
orded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with an elec-
tronic listening and recording device at the time he was making the 
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phone calls and transmitting wagering information in a public tele-
phone booth.134 At the trial, the Government was allowed to intro-
duce evidence of Katz’s phone calls over Katz’s objections.135 The 
Court of Appeals rejected that the recordings were a Fourth Amend-
ment violation because there was no physical entrance into the 
phone booth where Katz was making the call.136 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to answer the petitioner’s two questions: whether 
a public telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area such 
that any evidence collected by an electronic listening device was a 
Fourth Amendment violation and whether physical entrance into a 
constitutionally protected area is necessary to have a Fourth Amend-
ment violation.137 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by disagreeing with 
Katz’s phrasing of the issues.138 According to the Supreme Court, 
both Katz and the Government were incorrect to focus their argu-
ments on whether or not the phone booth was a constitutionally pro-
tected area.139 That type of argument deterred from the fundamental 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”140 The Supreme Court 
stated that the Fourth Amendment might constitutionally protect 
what a person seeks to keep as private.141 That means that the Fourth 
Amendment “cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical 
intrusion.”142 It is at that point that the Supreme Court began to move 
away from a Fourth Amendment common law trespass model to-
wards a privacy model.143 
Under the privacy model, even though Katz entered a transpar-
ent, public phone booth, he still expected to exclude “the uninvited 
ear” from his private conversation.144 The Supreme Court explained 
that,  “one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind 
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him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely enti-
tled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not 
be broadcast to the world.”145 The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s holding and concluded that whether Katz was in an office, a 
home, or a hotel room, he was “entitled to know that he will remain 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures,” especially when he 
clearly intended his conversations to remain private.146 
Katz is notable for it’s move towards a privacy model, but also 
for Justice Harlan’s concurrence. Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
agrees with the majority that the Fourth Amendment “protects peo-
ple, not places,” but takes a step further in an attempt to answer what 
protection it affords people.147 Justice Harlan attempts to answer this 
question by creating a reasonable expectation of privacy test.148 The 
reasonable expectation of privacy test is twofold: does a person have 
a subjective expectation of privacy and would that expectation be 
one that society would recognize as reasonable.149 According to Jus-
tice Harlan, the reasonable expectation of privacy test provides a 
better scope of Fourth Amendment protections.150 
C. The Supreme Court Directly Addresses the GPS: United States 
v. Jones 
The Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jones is possi-
bly one of the most important Fourth Amendment decisions since 
Katz.151 Jones produced multiple opinions, each with the potential 
to alter the Fourth Amendment search and seizure practices.152 Per-
haps most importantly, the Supreme Court in Jones clarified that 
although the court had moved towards the privacy model in Katz, 
the more traditional common law trespass model had not been re-
placed.153 
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Antoine Jones was the owner and operator of a nightclub in D.C. 
when he became a suspect for trafficking in narcotics.154 The FBI 
and Metropolitan police investigated and applied for a warrant to the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to authorize 
using a GPS to track the movements of a car registered to Jones’ 
wife.155 The Court issued a warrant authorizing the use of the GPS, 
but only within the District of Columbia and limited to 10 days.156 
On the 11th day, the agents installed the GPS device on the car while 
it was parked in a public lot in Maryland.157 The Government col-
lected information from the GPS for the next 28 days and even re-
placed the GPS battery when it ran out.158 The GPS relayed detailed 
information to the officers and revealed the car’s location within 50 
to 100 feet.159 By the end of the GPS surveillance period, the GPS 
relayed “2,000 pages of data over the four–week period.”160 
The Government used all the data from the GPS to obtain a mul-
tiple-count indictment against Jones and charged him with conspir-
acy to distribute cocaine.161 Jones was sentenced to life in prison, 
but the Court of Appeals reversed Jones’ conviction because the 
GPS evidence was collected without a warrant, which was consid-
ered a Fourth Amendment violation. After the Government’s peti-
tion for a rehearing was denied, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.162 
1. Majority Opinion: Justice Scalia 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, returned to the 
more traditional common law trespass model to analyze whether 
there was a Fourth Amendment violation in Jones’ case.163 Justice 
Scalia began by explaining that until Katz Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence was based on common-law trespass and that cannot be 
overlooked simply because of a rising trend with the privacy 
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model.164 The Fourth Amendment enumerates privacy in “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” because it has a close connection to 
property.165 Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall based solely 
on the reasonable expectation of privacy test.166 Otherwise, the 
Fourth Amendment would just state “the right of the people to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.”167 He further 
reasoned that courts should rely on the common law trespass model 
before even asking whether a person had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.168 If his statements about the importance of the trespass 
theory were still not clear enough, Justice Scalia wrote that “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not sub-
stituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”169 
After shifting towards the trespass model, Justice Scalia stated 
that the Government’s actions constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment because the Government physically occupied private 
property to obtain information when it attached a GPS to Jones’ 
car.170 According to Justice Scalia, such a physical intrusion on a 
person’s property leaves “no doubt” that a search occurred within 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment.171 The Supreme Court con-
cluded its analysis determining that a search occurred, but did not 
analyze whether that search was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because that specific issue was not raised in the lower 
courts.172 
2. Concurrence: Justice Sotomayor 
Justice Scalia’s views of the common law trespass model versus 
the privacy model are binding majority rules because of Justice So-
tomayor’s fifth vote.173 Justice Sotomayor added to Justice Scalia’s 
majority holding warning about the dangers of technology in her 
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concurrence.174 Justice Sotomayor was concerned that technology 
has become so advanced that soon it will be possible for the Gov-
ernment to monitor people without physical intrusion on any 
space.175 
Justice Sotomayor specifically referenced the dangers of GPS 
tracking because of its unique attributes.176 She noted that a GPS 
reveals aggregated information, has data storage and mining capac-
ities, and is a readily accessible, affordable tool.177 A GPS can ac-
curately produce “a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”178 This is 
unrestrained power to collect information that could be easily 
abused by law enforcement officials.179 
The public’s awareness that law enforcement officials could be 
monitoring citizens with GPS is also dangerous because it “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”180 The knowledge that GPS 
monitoring could be taking place at any moment could “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimi-
cal to democratic society.”181 Justice Sotomayor concluded her con-
currence by requesting that future law enforcement officials and 
judges consider the attributes of a GPS when determining what is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a modern day society.182 
D. Modern Day Monitoring: Grady v. North Carolina 
Torrey Dale Grady was a recidivist sex offender who lived in 
North Carolina.183 Grady was convicted of second-degree sexual of-
fense in 1997 and was convicted again in 2006 for taking indecent 
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liberties with a child.184 After serving his sentence, Grady was or-
dered to appear in court to determine whether he should be subjected 
to satellite-based monitoring because he was a recidivist sex of-
fender under a North Carolina statute.185 
The satellite-based monitoring program was outlined in the 
North Carolina General Statutes.186 The North Carolina statute de-
lineating the logistics of the satellite-based monitoring program 
states, 
“(c) The satellite-based monitoring program shall 
use a system that provides all of the  following: 
(1) Time-correlated and continuous tracking of 
the geographic location of the subject using a global 
positioning system based on satellite and other loca-
tion tracking technology. 
(2) Reporting of subject’s violations of prescrip-
tive and proscriptive schedule or location require-
ments. Frequency of reporting may range from once 
a day (passive) to near real-time (active).”187 
In this case, the satellite-based monitoring would effectively re-
quire Grady to wear a tracking device at all times.188 Grady argued 
that being forced to wear a tracking device would constitute an un-
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and that would vi-
olate his constitutional rights. 
The trial court was not convinced by Grady’s argument and or-
dered him to enroll in the satellite-based monitoring program “for 
the rest of his life.”189 Grady relied on Jones to appeal his case and 
proffered a Fourth Amendment challenge.190 The Court of Appeals 
rejected Grady’s challenge a second time, and Grady then petitioned 
for discretionary review with the North Carolina Supreme Court, but 
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his appeal was dismissed.191 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately is-
sued a per curiam opinion to address Grady’s case. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by citing prior cases that 
discussed Fourth Amendment violations that also occurred because 
the Government “physically occupied private property for the pur-
pose of obtaining information.”192 The Supreme Court stated that if 
there is a physical intrusion in a constitutionally protected area, then 
it is not necessary to analyze whether a person had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.193 The Supreme Court also emphasized that a 
search under the Fourth Amendment is possible even though a mon-
itoring program is civil in nature because “it is well settled that the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection extends beyond the sphere of crim-
inal investigations.”194 
In Grady’s case, the satellite-based monitoring program triggers 
the Fourth Amendment because the program is designed to obtain 
information by physically intruding on Grady’s person.195  This 
physical intrusion results in a Fourth Amendment search.196 The 
most important question to determine the constitutionality of the 
program is whether the search was reasonable.197 The Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the North Carolina courts to determine 
the reasonableness of the search.198 The Supreme Court provided the 
North Carolina courts with guidance for analyzing the reasonable-
ness of the search by writing that reasonableness is determined by 
analyzing the totality of the circumstances.199 In order to apply the 
totality of circumstances test, the North Carolina Court would have 
to look to the nature and purpose of the search as well as the extent 
to which the search intrudes upon reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy.200 
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IV. PIECING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PUZZLE 
TOGETHER 
The courts in Lopez-Mendoza and Verdugo-Urquidez did not 
state that undocumented immigrants have no Fourth Amendment 
rights, but they also did not state that undocumented immigrants 
have Fourth Amendment rights.201 There is simply no clear answer 
as to whether undocumented immigrants have Fourth Amendment 
rights or what those Fourth Amendment rights include.202 However, 
Lopez-Mendoza and Verdugo-Urquidez provide some guidance as 
to how a court should make a Fourth Amendment analysis.203 
The first factor to consider in a Fourth Amendment analysis is 
whether there are any substantial connections to the United States.204 
According to the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez, an undocu-
mented immigrant should form a substantial connection to the 
United States before invoking Fourth Amendment protections.205 
Although the Supreme Court did not detail what constitutes a sub-
stantial connection, it did state that the connection should be volun-
tary.206 
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall expand on the substantial 
connection test in their dissent for Verdugo-Urquidez.207 According 
to Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, Verdugo-Urquidez did 
form a substantial connection to the United States because he was 
subject to its criminal laws and he was being investigated for viola-
tion of those laws.208 Verdugo-Urquidez was facing criminal sanc-
tions and possibly prison time; therefore, “the Government has made 
him a part of our community for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”209  The Government thus can, and did, supply the necessary 
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substantial connection to justify invoking Fourth Amendment pro-
tections.210 
The second factor to consider in a Fourth Amendment analysis 
is where the potential Fourth Amendment violation took place.211 In 
Lopez-Mendoza, the Fourth Amendment violation took place in Cal-
ifornia, which is within the United States borders.212 The Supreme 
Court in Lopez-Mendoza assumed the Fourth Amendment was ap-
plicable and did not analyze the location of the possible Fourth 
Amendment violation.213 Unlike Lopez-Mendoza, the possible 
Fourth Amendment violation in Verdugo-Urquidez took place out-
side of the United States borders in Mexico.214 The Supreme Court 
in Verdugo-Urquidez stated that the Fourth Amendment was not in-
tended to restrain the action of the Government outside of the United 
States borders.215 Justice Kennedy even stated in his concurrence 
that “if the search had occurred in a residence within the United 
States, I have little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth 
Amendment would apply.”216 
A third factor to consider in a Fourth Amendment analysis is 
whether the undocumented immigrant has committed any crimes 
and whether his case is civil or criminal.217 At this point it is im-
portant to reflect on the DHS’s mission and focus on targeting un-
documented immigrants that could be linked to terrorism or general 
criminal activities.218 Criminal activity is a priority for DHS, and 
therefore, DHS should theoretically be more lenient with undocu-
mented immigrants involved in civil matters—especially consider-
ing its limited resources.219 Courts also consider the criminal activ-
ity of an undocumented immigrant when determining how far to ex-
tend Fourth Amendment protections.220 The Supreme Court in 
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Lopez-Mendoza was more sympathetic of Lopez-Mendoza because 
he was not invoking the Fourth Amendment in a criminal case nor 
was he a suspect for a crime.221 Lopez-Mendoza was an immigration 
detainee facing deportation, and therefore, his case was “purely 
civil.”222 However, the Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez was 
hesitant to rule in favor of Verdugo-Urquidez because he was sus-
pected of drug smuggling and participating in the murder of a DEA 
agent.223 
V. ANALYSIS 
It is a challenge trying to apply any of the Fourth Amendment 
tests or factors to determine whether DHS’s use of GPS ankle brace-
let monitoring is constitutional because the undocumented immi-
grant population is so diverse. There is no typical undocumented 
immigrant and to suggest otherwise would be to base a legal analysis 
on stereotypes and misinformation. However, for the purpose of this 
article, this note assumes certain shared characteristics based on the 
factors DHS claims to consider when determining who will wear the 
ankle bracelets versus who will stay in a detention center. 
DHS immigration enforcement is somewhat of a priority-based 
system due to limited resources.224 In keeping with its mission, DHS 
focuses on undocumented immigrants that pose a direct threat to na-
tional security followed by undocumented immigrants that entered 
the country with criminal convictions such as human trafficking, 
drug trafficking, child pornography, and other serious crimes.225 Ac-
cording to Jennifer Elzea, an ICE spokeswoman, the undocumented 
immigrants that are allowed to leave detention centers and are forced 
to wear ankle bracelets are usually “those who don’t pose a threat to 
public safety.”226 DHS has also clarified that undocumented immi-
grants who are under 18, pregnant, or have significant medical is-
sues are not issued ankle bracelets.227 
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Considering the scope of the DHS budget and the limitations on 
who can wear the ankle bracelets it is possible to assume a few 
shared characteristics amongst the undocumented immigrants wear-
ing ankle bracelets. Undocumented immigrants that are subject to 
the Alternative to Detention Programs, specifically monitoring 
through ankle bracelets, are most likely (1) young to middle aged 
immigrants with (2) no criminal record that (3) came to the United 
States voluntarily. In order to examine whether the ankle bracelet 
monitoring programs, such as current the RGV 250 program, are 
constitutional this note will apply a few of the most commonly used 
Fourth Amendment tests. 
The extent of constitutional protections afforded to undocu-
mented immigrants is still an unanswered question by the Supreme 
Court. However, due to the fact that the undocumented immigrants 
wearing ankle bracelets are not criminals and are in the United States 
voluntarily, it is possible to assume from Lopez-Mendoza and Ver-
dugo-Urquidez that they have at least minimal Fourth Amendment 
protections.228 
A. Trespass Model 
Justice Scalia’s trespass model consists of a two-part test that 
determines if a constitutional violation occurred.229 The first part 
questions whether the Government engaged in a physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area.230 The second part questions 
whether the intrusion was for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation.231 Throughout the analysis it is helpful to keep in mind that 
the Fourth Amendment enumerates privacy “in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” because it establishes the scope of what 
is considered a constitutionally protected area.232 
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Undocumented immigrants are required to wear the GPS ankle 
bracelets for extended periods of time and are constantly being mon-
itored by DHS.233 This means that GPS ankle bracelets are not only 
on the person of the undocumented immigrant, but the GPS ankle 
bracelets also enter into their houses and their effects. 
Did the Government engage in a physical intrusion on a consti-
tutionally protected area? Yes. Did the Government intrude in a con-
stitutionally protected area for the purpose of obtaining information? 
Yes. 
B. Privacy Model: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
The privacy model test is effectively Justice Harlan’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in Katz.234 Under this test, a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs when the Government takes certain in-
trusive actions and a person had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.235 The test to determine if there was a reasonable expectation 
of privacy is twofold: (1) Does a person have a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy? and (2) Would that expectation be one that society 
would recognize as reasonable?236 
Undocumented immigrants wearing ankle bracelets have a 
lower reasonable expectation of privacy than other people living in 
the United States with a legal immigration status because they al-
ready understand that DHS is monitoring their every move. The an-
kle bracelets do not evaporate all privacy interests entirely though. 
Despite the ankle bracelets, undocumented immigrants can still have 
reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Perhaps most notably, undocumented immigrants have a reason-
able expectation of privacy when they are inside their homes. The 
GPS on the ankle bracelets can send signals to multiple satellites and 
those satellites can accurately triangulate the location of the GPS to 
within a few feet or sometimes within ten inches.237 That means that 
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DHS would not only be able to know when you arrive to your home, 
but also where exactly you are in your home. DHS could learn inti-
mate details, such as when you are cooking and showering. Undoc-
umented immigrants most likely have a subjective expectation of 
privacy that DHS will not be such an extreme constant presence in-
side their homes. Society is likely to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable because society, as well as the courts, recognizes that ar-
bitrary searches of one’s home are a “chief evil” and that the Fourth 
Amendment aims to protect the “sanctity of the home.”238 
C. Mosaic Theory Test 
The mosaic theory best applies to situations when there is long-
term surveillance or advanced technology, such as a GPS, that can 
relay a great deal of information over a long period of time. In this 
case, DHS uses both long-term surveillance and advanced technol-
ogy. The mosaic theory states that, 
“Privacy interests, such as those protected under the Fourth 
Amendment, should be  protected in a manner that guards 
against collections of small bits of information that  individually 
may not be particularly revealing but when aggregated may reveal a 
great  deal.”239 
Under the mosaic theory, a collection of a person’s individual 
movements can create a rap sheet where the whole reveals “more 
than the individual movements it comprises.”240 For example, if law 
enforcement officials learn that a person visited a specific coffee 
shop on a Sunday and ordered a small coffee, then they might not 
learn much even though the surveillance was detailed. If the surveil-
lance is ongoing and law enforcements officials learn that this per-
son visits the same coffee shop and orders the same small coffee 
every Sunday, then they have learned about that person’s habits or 
patterns.241 
If this test is applied, the DHS ankle bracelet program is likely 
to be considered unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The 
GPS on the ankle bracelets are accurate and can relay highly detailed 
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information. Undocumented immigrants are also required to wear 
the bracelets throughout the day, every single day, for extended pe-
riods of time. Not only do the GPS ankle bracelets give DHS a whole 
picture of the private lives of these undocumented immigrants, but 
they also give an extremely accurate and intimate picture. 
D. Balancing Test 
The balancing test is typically applied in the civil context to eval-
uate the “reasonableness” of law enforcement officials in relation to 
the Fourth Amendment.242  The test functions by “balancing the le-
gitimate law enforcement interest with the level of intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest.”243 Before apply-
ing the balancing test, undocumented immigrants must have a 
Fourth Amendment privacy interest.244 The undocumented immi-
grants wearing ankle bracelets at a minimum have  Fourth Amend-
ment privacy interests in their person and their home. 
The law enforcement officials in this case are the DHS agency. 
DHS’s interest is in preventing terrorist attacks and reducing the vul-
nerability of the United States to terrorism.245 Initially, it appears 
that DHS has a weighty interest, but after some analysis, its interests 
are not that substantial. The undocumented immigrants wearing the 
ankle bracelets do not have criminal records, which is why they were 
even allowed to leave the detention centers and enter the monitoring 
program. DHS is probably not concerned that the undocumented im-
migrants wearing the ankle bracelets are the type of people posing a 
terrorist threat to the United States or are making the United States 
vulnerable. DHS thus has an interest, but not a significant interest. 
The undocumented immigrants wearing the ankle bracelets have 
an interest in having privacy in their home and their person. The 
privacy interest of undocumented immigrants is further strength-
ened because the home has always been afforded special protection 
by the Fourth Amendment.246 Keeping in mind that the ankle brace-
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lets are on at all times and a GPS can relay extremely accurate in-
formation, the privacy interest of undocumented immigrants is 
much greater than the interest of DHS. 
After balancing the interests of DHS and the interests of undoc-
umented immigrants, the interests of undocumented immigrants tip 
the scale. The ankle bracelet monitoring programs would be consid-
ered unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. 
E. Evaluating the Results 
The DHS ankle bracelet monitoring programs are unconstitu-
tional under the trespass model, the privacy model, the mosaic the-
ory, and the balancing test. The interests of DHS in continuously 
monitoring undocumented immigrants with ankle bracelets do not 
compare to the substantial Fourth Amendment privacy interests of 
undocumented immigrants. 
First, the undocumented immigrants that are being subjected to 
ankle bracelet monitoring have no criminal records and do not pose 
a serious threat to the United States. Second, the undocumented im-
migrants wearing DHS ankle bracelets came into the United States 
voluntarily. Third, and perhaps most importantly, these undocu-
mented immigrants have either made a substantial connection to this 
country or will soon make a substantial connection since they chose 
to comply with United States law by wearing the ankle bracelets. 
DHS could have a better argument in favor of its ankle monitor-
ing programs if the monitoring were more limited. For example, 
DHS could monitor the undocumented immigrants only if they were 
to leave the house or perhaps during certain hours of the day. How-
ever, the continuous monitoring reveals far too many intimate de-
tails that result in unreasonable Fourth Amendment searches. 
There is little clarity in the Constitution regarding undocu-
mented immigrants, but at least one thing has always been clear. The 
Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the home.247 DHS is the 
second-largest investigative force in the federal government and it 
should not be focusing its resources on monitoring undocumented 
immigrants in a manner that undermines a widely acknowledged 
constitutional truth.248 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
DHS has been consistently violating the Fourth Amendment 
constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants with their intru-
sive policing practices for years in the name of “immigration en-
forcement.”249  Until the Supreme Court directly answers the ques-
tion of what Fourth Amendment rights undocumented immigrants 
are entitled to, it remains unclear as to what constitutional rights are 
afforded to undocumented immigrants. The lack of clarity concern-
ing the constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants might be 
a sign that the United States is not ready to abolish citizen and 
noncitizen distinctions.250 However, if the United States is not will-
ing to abolish distinctions based on immigration status, then it 
should at least guarantee a system of sufficient protections for per-
sonal rights.251 
The undocumented immigrants that are being subjected to the 
GPS ankle monitoring by DHS have already been classified as non-
threating to national security. In fact, it is because these undocu-
mented immigrants do not pose a threat and have no criminal rec-
ords that they are being released from the detention centers. For their 
good behavior and clean records, undocumented immigrants are re-
warded by DHS with a release from detention centers and a sentenc-
ing of constant monitoring for an undetermined period of time. 
This practice of “swapping prison beds for ankle bracelets” is 
effectively trading one detention center for a different type of deten-
tion center.252 Undocumented immigrants report that living outside 
a detention center with ankle bracelet monitoring does not feel much 
different than living in a detention center.253 Fresvinda Ponce, a 41-
year-old mother from Camayagua, Honduras describes her experi-
ence by stating “right now I feel free, but at the same time I think 
that I’m still not free, as long as I wear this shackle, I’m not happy. 
                                                                                                             
 249 Id. 
 250 Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocu-
mented Immigrants: On Gutierrez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 
35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 58-59 (2000). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Burnett, supra note 234. 
 253 See id. 
2016] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 185 
 
I feel like I’m still a prisoner.”254 Ponce is condemned to psycholog-
ically and physically living with her unhappiness for a seemingly 
endless period of time because she does not even know when she 
can remove the ankle bracelet.255 Ponce is not alone. Other undocu-
mented immigrants have reported that they too feel frustrated and 
demoralized because of the ankle bracelet monitoring programs.256 
For example, Carolina Menjivar, a 28-year-old Honduran states that, 
“[the ankle bracelet] makes me ashamed, because they only put 
them on criminals, and I’m not a criminal yet.”257 Immigrant advo-
cates have stated that because of these experiences, the ankle moni-
tors are not a “true alternative to detention, but rather a way to ex-
pand the scope of detention and further punish immigrants living in 
the U.S. illegally.”258 
It is unjust to treat undocumented immigrants like criminals 
without constitutional rights. Undocumented immigrants enter the 
United States as foreigners, but they form more than enough con-
nections to the country such that they are entitled to at least minimal 
Fourth Amendment protections. After evaluating the Fourth 
Amendment, this article concludes that based on the trespass model, 
the privacy model, the mosaic theory, and the balancing test, the 
DHS ankle bracelet monitoring programs are unconstitutional. 
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